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Introduction 
The Global Forum on Internet Governance held by the UNICT Task Force in New York 
on 25-26 March concluded that Internet governance issues were many and complex. The 
Secretary-General’s Working Group on Internet Governance will have to map out and 
navigate this complex terrain as it makes recommendations to the World Summit on an 
Information Society in 2005.  To assist in this process, the Forum recommended, in the 
words of the Deputy Secretary-General of the United Nations at the closing session, that 
a matrix be developed “of all issues of Internet governance addressed by multilateral 
institutions, including gaps and concerns, to assist the Secretary-General in moving 
forward the agenda on these issues.” 
 
This paper takes up the Deputy Secretary-General’s challenge.  It is an analysis of the 
state of play in Internet governance in different forums, with a view to showing: (1) what 
issues are being addressed (2) by whom, (3) what are the types of consideration that these 
issues receive and (4) what issues are not adequately addressed. 
 
There is already some governance of the Internet, as many of the studies presented to the 
Global Forum show.  The governance takes place in a variety of organizations and 
regimes: some are intergovernmental, as international conventions are implemented; 
some are in the business world, as technical standards are developed; still others take 
place in civil society institutions.  If all these different regimes function properly to 
maintain order, the Internet governance issue is simple: do no harm and let them be.  
However, if key component regimes do not function well, or produce contradictions or 
conflict with other regimes, or if major areas are missing, then the conflicts or problems 
must be addressed by new agreements. 
 
 
Other Catalogues 
 
In preparing this matrix of Internet governance activities, we build on the efforts of 
others. The Markle Foundation has prepared a useful listing of international organizations 
and their ICT-related projects and divisions.1 The Markle report, however, does not focus 
specifically on Internet governance and provides no framework for classification and 
analysis of Internet governance activities and agreements, nor does it delve into the 
intersection or interactions between the different organizations and activities. 
 
The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) has also prepared a valuable initial 
contribution.2 This report benefited from ICC’s broad catalogue of ICT-related initiatives 
at the national and international levels and in the private sector. However, this report 
explicitly develops and justifies its definitions and the conceptual framework used to 
                                                 
1 Guide to International ICT Policy Making, New York: The Markle Foundation, July 
2003. 
2 “Matrix of Issues Related to the Internet and Organizations Dealing with Them.” Paris: 
ICC, 16 March 2004. 
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classify and include various activities. In addition, it attempts to identify where 
agreements, disagreements and gaps exist, rather than simply listing activities. 
 
 
Conceptual Framework 
A conceptual framework is necessary if there is to be progress in dealing with Internet 
governance.  Any international negotiation for collective agreement must build on prior 
levels of agreements.  The first step is to agree on the “building blocks” of policy.  Those 
building blocks take two forms, each of which is relevant to Internet governance: 
· Statements of Fact: Before policy makers can make decisions about Internet 
governance, they must agree on what is “the Internet.”  Likewise, they need to agree 
on what constitutes “Internet governance.”  Without prior agreement on the relevant 
facts and definitions, higher-level discussions could be hindered by implicit and 
possibly unrecognized differences in understandings. 
· Norms:  After reaching a common understanding of the facts, policy makers need to 
agree on what is “good”.  Norms are standards and obligations that parties to Internet 
governance agree should be followed, serving as criteria to evaluate what is good and 
bad.  But norms are little more than a “wish list” unless they are grounded in a solid 
factual understanding of what exists, what is possible and the costs and benefits of 
change. Once policy makers agree on facts and foundational norms, it is then possible 
for them to formulate specific rules and procedures for governance. 
 
This report proposes statements of facts relevant for Internet governance.  These are not 
presented as definitive; final responsibility for identifying  the relevant facts lies with 
policy makers.  However, by presenting some initial definitions based on research, policy 
makers can be assisted in that task. This paper does not propose norms for Internet 
governance. Agreement on norms is a subsequent step that should be taken by the WGIG.  
 
Key statements of fact provide answers to the following questions: 
· What is the Internet? 
· What is Internet governance?  
· What are the different types of governance? 
· What players are engaged in what type of governance activities? 
 
 
Definitions 
 
The WGIG must define Internet governance. How one defines “Internet governance” 
depends critically on how one defines “the Internet.”  
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The Internet 
The Internet is not a hardware standard or a physical infrastructure. It is based on a set of 
software instructions (known as “protocols”) for sending data over networks.3 The 
Internet protocols can operate on many different physical technologies, and can be used 
as the underlying communication mechanism for almost any kind of higher-level 
software application, such as accessing Web sites, word processing, streaming video, 
voice communication or games. The key concept is “internetworking;” the Internet 
protocols were designed to link networks to networks.  
 
A widely-accepted reference model divides data communication systems into distinct 
“layers.” The schema, known as the OSI model, further clarifies the scope of what we 
mean by “the Internet.” (Figure 1) Under the OSI model, Internet Protocol (IP) would be 
classified as a “layer 3” standard.4 The Internet is not a specific software application; it is 
a carrier that allows software applications to communicate and interoperate. 
 
Figure 1 
 
 
 
Thus, we define Internet as the global data communication system formed by the 
interconnection of public and private telecommunication networks using Internet 
                                                 
3 Internet Protocol (IP) works by dividing messages up into “packets” and attaching sender and receiver 
addresses to those packets so that they can be routed to their destination. A closely related protocol, TCP, 
governs error control and the rate at which packets are sent. 
4 In the OSI model, layer 1 refers to physical (hardware) standards, such as those defining how fiber cables, 
radio frequencies or copper wires are constructed and make signals. Layer 2 standards define basic data 
structures and access control mechanisms on physical transmission media. Layer 3 is called the 
“networking” layer. It refers to the higher-level information about how the communicating devices are 
addressed and how the data they transmit is routed from sender to receiver. 
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Protocol (IP), TCP and the protocols required to implement IP internetworking on a 
global scale, such as DNS and packet routing protocols.”5   
Basic Facts about the Internet  
The Internet as it exists today has several characteristics that have to be taken into 
account in any discussion of governance.  These include the following:  
 
§ Standards Commons: The Internet is based on open and non-proprietary standards 
that can be freely adopted by anyone. Occasionally patented technology is 
incorporated into an Internet standard, but only if it is available at reasonable and 
nondiscriminatory rates. 
§ Private Market: The networks interconnected through the Internet protocols are 
owned and operated by autonomous organizations, mostly in the private sector. Most 
of the investment is small scale and private. Services and interconnection are 
coordinated primarily on a market, contractual basis. 
§ End-to-End Principle : The Internet protocols were designed to provide a neutral, 
transparent channel for the widest possible variety of information services. On the 
Internet, the network's job is limited to transmitting simple data units as efficiently as 
possible, leaving responsibility for software applications and other higher- level 
functions, such as authentication and encryption, to the devices connected to it. In 
other words, most of the intelligence and responsibility is located in devices at the 
ends of the network, not in the channel itself.6  
§ Global: The Internet’s methods of establishing communication are non-territorial. 
The routing structure is independent of political jurisdictions and connection costs are 
insensitive to distance and political boundaries. This has created a non-territorial 
arena for human interaction and thus for policy and governance. At the earliest stages 
of the Internet’s development it might have been possible for its connectivity 
arrangements to be structured to conform to national boundaries. Address blocks 
might have been given to countries instead of to global or regional entities, a national 
or territorial address assignment policy might have been adopted instead of Internet 
service provider-based address assignment, and global top-level domains could have 
been eliminated and everyone forced into country codes. But this is not the way the 
Internet evolved, and any attempt to force it into a territorial model now would 
involve enormous transitional costs. 
                                                 
5 This definition recognizes that an enormous number of applications have been developed that run on top 
of the IP protocols, but only a few of them are truly core to the functioning of the Internet. We include DNS 
as a core Internet protocol, for example, because the growing number of applications using the Internet 
make the detachment of names from IP addresses ever more necessary. Likewise, routing of IP traffic 
would almost certainly grind to a halt without CIDR, BGP and a few other critical routing protocols.  
6 Our use of the term “end to end” is based on paragraph 2.3 of RFC 1958, “Architectural Principles of the 
Internet” (June 1996). We recognize that some definitions of “end-to-end” focus on the “transparency” of 
the connection between hosts, and that this form of “end-to-end” is regularly violated by Network Address 
Translators, proxy servers and firewalls. But we do not consider transparency to be an inherent feature of 
the Internet.  
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Internet Governance 
We define Internet governance as “collective action, by governments and/or the private 
sector operators of the networks connected by the Internet, to establish agreements about 
the standards, policies, rules, and enforcement and dispute resolution procedures to apply 
to global internetworking activities.” In other words, our matrix of IG institutions 
includes only those legal, regulatory and policy problems that are arise as a direct 
consequence of the involved parties’ mutual use of the Internet protocols to communicate 
globally. Note that our definition includes private sector actors as parties to governance. 
If one understands how the Internet’s architecture distributes decision making power over 
the internetworking process, this cannot be avoided.  
 
The definitions are designed to draw a clear boundary around Internet governance issues. 
Under our definitions any technical standards or resource assignment issues that occur at 
layers 1 and 2 are not considered Internet governance problems, and most (but not all) 
issues in the application layer are not considered part of Internet governance. But public 
policy issues cannot be so easily bounded, because intergovernmental policies or treaties 
don’t fall into neatly defined “layers.” Policy can “govern” various aspects of 
internetworking by affecting the physical layer or by shaping the external economic or 
legal environment in which the Internet operates, for example by regulating the business 
of Internet service provision or penalizing spammers. But to qualify as Internet 
governance, the object of the policy must be to somehow affect internetworking using the 
Internet protocols. 
 
In the early stages of the WSIS process, definitional debates centered on the distinction 
between a “narrow” definition that encompassed only ICANN-related functions (Internet 
resource allocation and assignment), and a “broad” definition that seemed to include 
anything and everything related to ICT governance. Both extremes miss the mark. 
Confining concepts of Internet governance to ICANN is arbitrary; any objective analysis 
reveals that WIPO treaties, e-commerce conventions and other developments must be 
considered forms of Internet governance, because they directly target and behaviors that 
rely on communication via the Internet protocols. 
 
On the other hand, the definition advanced here also counteracts a widespread tendency 
to blur the line between “Internet governance” and “governance of all forms of 
communication and information.” Conflating those two things is a mistake the WGIG 
cannot afford to make. Even our limited definition of “Internet governance” encompasses 
a very large range of issues and activities, as Tables 1 and 2 show. If its scope is defined 
even more broadly it will be impossible to develop coherent responses to problems. 
Internet is just a subset of information and communication technologies (ICTs). There are 
many governance issues related to ICTs that cannot be affected by developing rules or 
policies for the Internet. Our definitions facilitate a clearer focus on the problems specific 
to global internetworking. If accepted and used consistently by the WGIG participants, 
the definitions prevent Internet governance from becoming a proxy for other problems 
that really have little to do with the Internet. 
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We recognize that the Internet can be affected by governance in adjacent areas. For 
example, spectrum availability, which is really a physical layer problem that is not 
specific to the Internet, might affect the applications and uses of the Internet. To capture 
these kinds of interrelationships, one would need a broader (and much fuzzier) definition 
of Internet governance.  
 
Is the “digital divide” an Internet Governance Issue? Only partly. Under our definitions, 
gaps in physical telecom infrastructure development would not be considered an “Internet 
governance” issue. Disparities in physical access facilities involve all forms of ICT, not 
just the Internet. Those gaps reflect disparities in economic development and access to 
finance capital. Changing the way internetworking with IP is governed cannot, by itself, 
make fundamental changes in that situation. On the other hand, Internet governance can 
affect the distribution of Internet-related resources such as IP numbers or domain names. 
It might also affect the way Internet service providers pay each other for interconnection, 
or the degree of competition in the supply of Internet services, which in turn might affect 
development or the distribution of wealth.  
 
If one ignores the crucial distinction between Internet and ICTs generally and attempts to 
use “Internet governance” as the lever for addressing global disparities in all forms of 
ICTs, one is likely to fail at both Internet governance and at bridging the digital divide. 
Internet governance regimes cannot do much to improve financing of or access to 
infrastructure; by the same token, constructing or extending physical infrastructure will 
not by itself resolve the transnational governance issues unique to global internetworking. 
The WGIG has to be clear about what problems it is trying to solve, and recognize that it 
cannot solve all of them. 
 
The Three Governance Functions  
 
What is meant by “governance?” Here as before, precise and clear distinctions are 
helpful. We have already provided a general definition of Internet governance. Within 
that framework, three distinct types of governance functions have been identified and 
form the basis of the inventory. They are: 1) technical standardization, 2) resource 
allocation and assignment, and 3) policy formulation, policy enforcement, and dispute 
resolution. Each function is characterized by different processes and expertise, different 
methods of “enforcement,” and is often carried out by different organizations. It clarifies 
the analysis greatly to keep the three functions distinct. 
 
Technical Standardization  
 
The first function is technical standardization. This has to do with how decisions are 
made regarding the basic networking protocols, software applications, and data format 
standards that make the Internet work. Organizations that perform these functions define, 
develop and reach consensus on technical specifications. The specifications are then 
published and have value as a means of coordinating equipment manufacturing, software 
design and service provision in ways that ensure technical compatibility and 
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interoperation.  The technical standardization functions of the Internet have been 
performed mainly by non-State actors, as our tables will show. In Internet governance, 
there is often a close relationship between technical factors and policy. Policy choices 
may be constrained by technical architecture or concerns about technical feasibility; by 
the same token, there is sometimes pressure put on technical standards developers to 
embed or reflect policy decisions in their standards development.  
 
Resource Allocation and Assignment 
 
The second function is resource allocation and assignment.  When usage of a global 
resource, such as the IP address space, radio spectrum or telephone country number 
codes, must be exclusive, usage must be coordinated or administered by an organization 
or some other mechanism. The assignment authority allocates or partitions the resource 
space and assigns parts of it to specific users. They also develop policies, procedures or 
rules to guide the allocation and assignment decisions. This function was the original 
source of controversy in Internet governance, where disputes concerning the assignment 
of top-level domain names led to the creation of the Internet Corporation for Assigned 
Names and Numbers (ICANN). 
 
Resource assignment is not the same thing as technical standardization. Technical 
standards may create a virtual resource that requires exclusive assignment when put into 
operation (e.g., the technical standards defining the IP protocol creates an address space, 
and the DNS protocol defines the domain name space). But defining and reaching 
consensus on the standard is a completely different function from the subsequent 
allocation and assignment of the resources. Some organizations combine both functions 
(e.g., IEEE Ethernet group, ITU);7 other organizations (e.g., ICANN, IETF, North 
American Numbering Council) do not.  The issue of the authority behind the 
organizations or mechanisms is important in resource allocation.  Who is ultimately 
responsible for the decisions made, in legal and political terms, becomes important and 
often the entity that has legitimate authority can affect how resources are assigned.  When 
resources are scarce, control of the institutions becomes important to the concerned 
actors. 
 
Policy Formulation, Enforcement and Dispute Resolution 
 
The third function is policy making. This refers to the formulation of policy, enforcement 
and monitoring, and dispute resolution. It involves the development of norms, rules and 
procedures that govern the conduct of people and organizations, as opposed to the 
structure and operation of the technology. While the Internet itself is merely a channel for 
communication and, in that sense, is policy-neutral, many public policy issues arise either 
as a consequence of its use by a growing number of people in an international context, or 
                                                 
7 But when the same organization combines both standards making and resource allocation/assignment, the 
two functions are almost always carried out by separate departments or divisions. 
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because States and non-State actors want to respond to national and international 
problems by regulating the technological system itself.   
 
Including this third function defines what can be termed the broad view of Internet 
governance.  While some have argued that by dealing with policy issues, the scope may 
become too broad, we intend to show that it is the linkages between policy issues and the 
rules and procedures for standardization and resource assignment that produces the most 
significant governance problems.  A more comprehensive view of Internet governance 
can help solve the problems that issue-regimes face when they confront the non-territorial 
way in which the Internet functions. 
 
Categorizing Actors in Internet Governance 
 
The international nature of the Internet means that most Internet governance has to take 
place through multilateral actors.  Some of these are international organizations through 
which States transact their business, but many are non-State in nature.  Within the 
category of State actors are those whose membership is open to all States, and those that 
limit membership by region, economic status, or some other criterion.  Among non-State 
actors, some have been formally established and legally recognized, while others are 
informal.   
 
Whether governance takes place in one or another venue is important. It affects the 
authoritative nature of the decisions, the legitimacy of the decisions, and the degree to 
which governance regimes permit or foreclose choice and competition.  
State Institutions with Universal Membership 
International organizations composed of States that are open to all recognized 
governments have been the traditional building block of global governance. Since the end 
of World War II, the UN system has formed the nexus of global governance. The UN 
Secretary-General has been given a role in Internet governance as a result of the first 
phase of WSIS.  A number of organizational units within the United Nations deal with 
specific aspects of governance through the international conventions that they service.  
They include the human rights regime supported by the Office of the High Commissioner 
for Human Rights, the model laws supported by the Secretariat of UNCITRAL, and the 
organized crime conventions supported by the Office on Drugs and Crime. The ITU and 
WIPO are State/Universal actors concerned with the technical and policy issues 
associated with telecommunications and intellectual property respectively.  In addition, 
the World Trade Organization monitors the Internet aspects of trade and UNESCO has a 
concern with education and freedom of expression. 
State Institutions with Non-Universal Membership 
Many of the issues related to Internet governance are dealt with in select groups of States.  
These are usually regional in nature, but some are based on economic interests. This 
includes the OECD, comprised of 30 States from a number of different regions that 
develops internationally agreed instruments, decisions and recommendations, and the G8.  
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It also includes regional organizations like the Council of Europe and APEC.  These 
organizations can develop principles, norms and rules that bind their members. 
Formal Non-State Institutions 
A considerable amount of Internet governance takes place in non-State institutions. A 
major example is the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), 
which is responsible for allocating top-level domain names and IP addresses. This 
organization is incorporated in California and formally reports to the United States 
Department of Commerce.  Another example is the Internet Systems Consortium, also 
chartered as a California not-for profit organization, which manages a globalized root 
server and issues the dominant software that implements the Internet’s DNS protocol. 
Informal Non-State Institutions 
Internet governance is sometimes provided by informal institutions.  These include 
particularly the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), which has defined most of the 
technical standards used by the Internet. Another example is the North American 
Network Operators Group (NANOG), an email list used to exchange technical alerts and 
information among Internet service operators. In addition, a number of informal 
groupings of civil society, including corporations, have worked to develop norms and 
standards relevant to the Internet.  An example is the Anti-Spam Technical Alliance 
(ASTA) whose founding members include America Online, British Telecom, Comcast, 
EarthLink, Microsoft, and Yahoo!  The World-Wide Web Consortium is a major 
grouping dealing with application software standards over the Internet and also plays a 
role in the development of technical standards in such areas as internet accessibility for 
persons with disabilities. 
State Actors 
In a few cases, national governments could also be considered “multilateral actors” 
because their decisions can affect the operation of the entire Internet.  For example, 
United States government entities like the Department of Commerce, the Federal 
Communications Commission, the Justice Department and the Department of Homeland 
Security can make decisions with extraterritorial effects (sometimes deliberately, 
sometimes inadvertently). The report highlights a few of those cases (e.g., the U.S. 
Department of Commerce relationship with ICANN), but concentrates most of its 
attention on the multilateral actors through which most States and non-state actors work 
on the international aspects of the Internet. 
 
 
The State of Play in Internet Governance Processes 
 
The matrix that has been developed is based on two tables.  Table 1 shows which 
organizations have been actively involved in Internet governance. Table 1 is a matrix 
with organizations forming columns, and issue-areas as rows. The activities in the cells 
are color-coded by type of governance function (technical standardization = blue, 
resource allocation/assignment = yellow, and policy = green). In a few cases, it also 
identifies where studies and meetings are taking place, although there is no attempt to 
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comprehensively cover this type of non-governance activity. Table 1 thus provides a 
quick overview of which organizations are active in which areas, what type of 
governance function they are performing, and the overall pattern of Internet governance.  
 
Table 2 is a larger table with rows for each issue-area and three columns. The first 
column, “Agreements,” provides a short description of the agreements in each issue. The 
second column provides a short description of areas of disagreement. The third column 
identifies gaps or concerns. To reach these observations, the method of analysis used was 
to examine the proceedings of the organizations in which the discussions have been 
taking place and from that to extract the necessary conclusions.  An agreement is said to 
exist if it is embodied in a decision formally reached by an intergovernmental body (in 
the case of State-based organizations) or by the organization’s stakeholders (for non-
State-based organizations).  This can be a convention (which would be legally binding), 
or a resolution adopted by consensus (that would be normatively binding). A 
disagreement is when there is clearly more than one position and the body concerned has 
not yet been able to resolve it.  Finally, a gap exists if an issue that should be considered 
from the perspective of other forums, but is not being considered at all. 
 
Table 1: Who is Doing What 
 
As can be seen from Table 1, a large number of organizations, both State and non-State, 
are actively involved in Internet governance.  Governance is fragmented; no one 
organization dominates any of the issue areas, and there are almost no issue areas in 
which only one organization is involved. Among state actors there is a clear segmentation 
of organizations by issue area, but the segmentation is breaking down in certain key 
areas. Notably in e-commerce and intellectual property, States have had to confront the 
impact of the Internet on pre-existing international agreements. As these implications 
have become clearer, the scope of the issue has grown; e.g., intellectual property 
protection policy has spilled over into free expression policy and trade policy, while e-
commerce issues also spill over into trade. One surprise is how little systematic activity 
there is in the area of competition policy. 
 
ICANN is involved in policy governance that touches on several issue-areas as they 
relate to domain names: free expression, privacy, and trademark protection. Its resource 
allocation/assignment activities also affect competition policy, authentication, security 
and global resource management as they pertain to domain names and IP addresses. 
ICANN’s unique basis in private contracts gives it real leverage to address a broad range 
of issues related to the resources it manages. 
 
Governance of technical standardization and resource allocation/assignment is largely in 
the hands of non-State actors. One of the key organizations, the IETF, is not a formal 
organization.  
 
 
 
 Table 1.  Organizational involvement by issue area 
    State (Intergovernmental) Non-State 
    Universal NonUniversal Formal Informal 
UN HCHR EU  APEC   ISC Issue Area Issue ITU WIPO 
UNESCO 
WTO UNCITRAL UN-ODC 
CoE 
OECD 
ASEAN 
Hague Conference 
G8 
ICANN 
Centr, APTLD 
RIRs IETF  Others 
Privacy     Human R ights 
Conventions 
      EU 1995 
Directive  
Guidelines   Lyon Group 2001 
Recommendations  
Whois 
Database policy  
        
    Optional Protocol 
to CRC; CERD 
              TLD strings        ICRA, PICs 
Content 
    
UNESCO norms, 
diversity 
convention 
                      
W3C 
accessibility 
standards 
  
UDRP – critical 
domain names  
Commiss. on 
Human Rights       
 CoE 
Declaration   
1999 ASEAN 
porn 
framework 
  
UDRP – critical 
domain names          
Human 
Rights 
  
Freedom of Expression 
  
  Copyright-Fair Use  CCPR                        
Copyright  
1996 Performance 
Phono  Treaty;1996  
Copyright Treaty  
            
Trademark  
UDRP; 2nd domain 
name proceeding; 
2001 Joint Rec on 
Marks 
       UDRP     
IPR 
 
 
Patents  Substantive Patent 
Law Treaty  
 
TRIPS 
 
 
           
Trade  ICAIS   UNESCO 
diversity conv. 
TRIPS                       
E-commerce         Model Laws       
e-ASEAN  
framework 
agreement 
 Hague Convention          
Consumer Protection               Guidelines Guidelines             
Taxation       Policy 
discussion 
      TAG on taxes              
TLD creation 
Int.ernational  
Economic 
Relations 
 
 
 
Competition Policy       
EU ISP merger 
review 
Studies 
 
Studies 
  Registry Contracts 
Regstrar Accred. 
    
Network and IS Security  
Plenipot  
Resolution 130              
APEC e- 
Security TG  
Lyon Group - 2000 
Communique  SSAC  BIND  
Routing 
Security  
DNSSEC 
Secure BGP  
Cyber Crime &  
Cyber Terrorism           
Convention on 
Organized 
Crime 
CoE Cybercrime 
Convention      
Lyon Group  2001 
Recommendations         
Spam  Meetings             Meetings        RBL     ASTA Studies 
Enforcement  
of Order 
 
Authentication & Identity  
 
PKI standards    Model Laws      
Whois data 
accuracy 
DNSSEC / 
ccTLDS 
IP address 
Whois 
 
IRIS 
 
 
E.164                   IP address anycast RSs  ENUM root 
(RIPE) 
IDN 
standards 
 
ccTLD meetings                   IDN TLDs  BIND IP address     
Global Resource 
Management 
 ENUM cc’s, .int                    DNS Root ccTLDs       
ICAIS, Rec. D.50               APEC norms           
Operational 
Policies for the 
Internet 
Interconnection 
IP-PSTN interop                         
Routing  
 protocols   
             
Legend Resource Assignment  Technical Standardization        
 Policy Development, Rules, Recommendations  Meetings, Conferences        
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Table 2: The Nature and Depth of Agreements 
 
Table 2 (end of document) shows that the agreements cover many areas, but often do not extend 
much beyond general norms; agreement is broad but not deep. Examples include the CHR 
Resolution 2003/42, the Durban Declaration, Articles 17 and 19 of the Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, and the Council of Europe Resolution on Free Expression. All 
articulate widely accepted norms, but none are based on common understandings of the 
basic facts of the Internet and therefore cannot translate the norms into specific rules and 
procedures that would make them globally enforceable. Frequently, the absence of an 
agreement about implementation is a deliberate result of the international system, which 
is based on territorial sovereignty and prefers to leave enforcement to the national 
governments. Lack of deeper agreement about implementation leaves the international 
organizations without the ability to monitor the application of agreed norms and 
procedures. 
 
Many agreements are sector-specific and tend to neglect linkages with other areas.  For 
example, the WIPO treaties on circumvention of copyright protection may not mesh with 
UNESCO-supported norms regarding the promotion of science and culture. The ICANN 
policies regarding access to contact data about domain name registrants may conflict with 
some widely accepted international norms regarding privacy and some national laws. 
Where there are deep agreements, most notably in electronic commerce and privacy, they 
have been realized in non-universal organizations like the OECD, so they are limited in 
their application.  In other areas, the absence of an agreement about implementation 
leaves international organizations without the ability to ensure consistency in the 
application of agreed norms and procedures by national governments.  
 
Two factors may inhibit deeper agreements about Internet governance. First, policy 
bodies have not formally recognized and accepted the non-territorial nature of the 
Internet. Traditional international agreements are based on the assumption of territorial 
jurisdiction, and this foundational condition simply does not hold here. There is no 
consensus on, and in most forums no real discussion of, the nature of the Internet as a 
globalized channel of communication.  
 
ICANN's private sector-based, contractual approach to Internet governance was 
originally put forward as a solution to the problem of non-territoriality. Whatever its 
normative merits, the ICANN regime has potentially global effects, because contracts 
allow policies and norms to be translated directly into rules and enforced upon any 
private actors. But, as noted in Table 2, there are still fundamental disagreements about 
the ICANN regime. One of the most important is the supervisory and contractual 
authority over ICANN and the DNS root zone held unilaterally by the U.S. Government. 
There are also disagreements about the nature of ICANN, that concern the role of the 
Government Advisory Committee and the lack of effective participation by developing 
country governments and stakeholders. 
 
Consensus is also inhibited by the lack of recognition, acceptance and understanding of 
the end to end principle. Absent basic agreement here, it is unlikely that solid consensus 
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in many policy domains can be reached. If, for example, it is agreed that the Internet 
should continue to conform to the end-to-end principle, the focus of policy would be on 
the senders and recipients of messages rather than the channel itself. If, on the other hand, 
governments believe that control and other policy mechanisms should be built into the 
underlying Internet code, the focus of policy might be on that. 
 
 
Catalogue of Organizations by Governance Function 
 
In this section the report expands upon Table 2 with a narrative discussion. The 
discussion takes each of the three governance functions, identifies and describes the 
organizations involved in that area, and mentions the relevant agreements, disagreements, 
and gaps.  
 
Technical Standardization Function 
 
In our view, there are really only two venues that are critical to the development of core 
Internet standards on a global basis: the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), and the 
International Telecommunication Union (ITU), specifically, the ITU-T. Of these, IETF-
related activities constitute the dominant force in Internet standards. ITU-T is moving 
into the development of Internet standards and sees that move as critical to its future, but 
at the present time its work on Internet standards can be seen as supplementary to (and 
sometimes competitive with) IETF activity. The World Wide Web consortium (W3C) is 
relevant because it develops application-layer standards that facilitate private governance 
arrangements – but it does not really develop technical standards that govern IP 
internetworking as such. 
 
Based on our definition of the Internet, we do not include global general standards 
organizations such as IEEE or ISO or regional standards organizations such as ETSI as 
participants in Internet technical standardization. IEEE plays a very important role in the 
development of Layer 1 and Layer 2 standards often used in conjunction with the 
Internet, but it does not develop protocols central to the operation of the Internet as such. 
 
IETF (Nonstate/Informal) 
The IETF is unincorporated. It is not an organization per se but a set of organically 
evolved practices maintained by a combination of oral culture, RFC documents defining 
a process, and working groups focused on specific problems. Two appointed groups, the 
Internet Architecture Board (IAB) and the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG), 
take responsibility for overseeing certain aspects of the standards development process. 
Standards that emerge from the working groups with a “rough” or declared consensus are 
given an IETF-wide last call. They must then be approved by the IESG. There is an 
appeals process in which the IAB can overrule the IESG. To the extent that IETF has any 
legal identity, it is derived from the Internet Society (ISOC), which funds the RFC Editor, 
reviews and approves the selection of IAB members (which in turn reviews and approves 
IESG members), and generally provides something close to a central organizational focal 
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point for many of those active in IETF. However, IETF as a standards development 
process is open to any individual whether they are ISOC members or not, and in theory 
those involved in IETF standards work do so as individuals, not as representatives of 
corporations or governments. IETF’s budget is about US$ 2 million. 
 
As an informal non-state organization one cannot speak of “areas of agreement” or 
“disagreement” in IETF in the same way one would in reference to an international 
treaty. But one can identify some of the fundamental principles that have become 
institutionalized, self-reinforcing aspects of the IETF standards process: 
· Standards must be open and nonproprietary 
· The end-to-end principle8 is considered a critical norm 
· Standards should be simple, scalable, and extensible, and multiple 
implementations possible 
· Standards documentation should be open, public and freely available 
· Participation is open and participants act as individuals, not as formal 
representatives of corporations, governments or organizations.  
 
ITU (State/Universal) 
Formed in 1865, the ITU is the oldest intergovernmental organization in the world. The 
organization is currently divided into three sectors: Telecommunication Standardization 
(ITU-T), Radiocommunication (ITU-R), and Development (ITU-D). ITU as a whole has 
189 member states, supplemented by various “sector members” – mostly corporate 
equipment manufacturers and service providers, but also some international 
organizations. Each of its three sectors has its own committees, conferences and working 
methods. Over the course of its growth and development for more than a century, ITU 
has taken on a heterogeneous set of functions, ranging across standardization, policy 
making, resource assignment and allocation, sector research and statistics gathering, 
education, the promotion of telecoms development in developing countries, and running 
trade shows. For the years 2002-2003, the budget of the Union as a whole was 342 
million Swiss francs, or about US$ 279 million.  
 
For reasons explained above, we concentrate exclusively on ITU-T when discussing the 
standardization function. ITU-T’s standardization work is carried out by “Study Groups” 
restricted to ITU-T members. These develop standards known as “Recommendations.” 
Study Groups’ work is carried out primarily by industry representatives (sector-members) 
but the product must be approved by member states. Unlike IETF’s “rough” or 
“declared” consensus, ITU-T SGs operate on the basis strict consensus – no 
recommendations can be approved unless all member states agree to them, or refrain 
from opposing them. Unlike IETF, ITU-T charges for access to most of its key standards 
documents, and participation of private sector or civil society organizations requires 
                                                 
8 The Internet was designed to follow, as much as possible, the “end to end argument,” which is one of its 
few general architectural principles. End-to-end means that the design of the network is not optimized for 
any particular service or set of applications; the network provides basic data transport only, leaving 
applications and other forms of user-specific information processing to the devices attached to the ends of 
the network. 
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payment of substantial membership fees. Most of ITU-T’s Internet-related work takes 
place in Study Group 2 (E.164-related standards, including ENUM issues, voice QoS 
over IP networks) Study Group 13 (MPLS), Study Group 16 (Multimedia, H.323) and 
Study Group 17 (security, certificates and directories).  
ITU – IETF Relations 
ITU-T and IETF represent two distinct phases of standardization. With its emphasis on 
“rough consensus and running code” IETF was a place to create new standards for a new 
industry (Internet service).  ITU-T on the other hand maintains and upgrades standards in 
a long-established industry and technology. Now that the Internet has matured, IETF has 
to make the transition to the latter kind of standards-making, and its processes will have 
to adapt.  
 
ITU-T and IETF make an effort to work together, and many ITU-T Study Groups liaise 
with IETF on Internet-related standards. Perhaps inevitably, however, the relationship is 
sometimes competitive. IETF’s position as the definer of the core IP-related standards, its 
more focused nature, its resident expertise in those standards and the principles on which 
they are based, and the backing of major multinational corporations gives it the upper 
hand in Internet standard-setting. What ITU has that the IETF lacks is the participation 
and support of the world’s undeveloped and developing countries. With its one country, 
one-vote governance at the highest levels of its authority, the ITU’s processes are much 
more reflective of global politics than IETF’s.  
 
Any changes to the governance regime in standardization must recognize and accept a 
basic constraint: the world of information and communication technology development is 
too large, complex and diverse to be managed in any single forum. The producer groups 
involved can and will migrate to whatever standards development venue suits their 
interests.  
 
W3C - World Wide Web Consortium (Non-State/Informal) 
The W3C does not develop Internet standards per se. It develops important standards and 
technologies regarding data structures and formats that are commonly used on the 
Internet, but these applications ride on top of the Internet protocols just as many other 
applications produced by private enterprises or small-scale standards coalitions do. We 
include W3C here because its standards are sometimes intended to facilitate private gov-
ernance arrangements. For example, its Platform for Internet Content Selection (PICS) 
was designed to permit end users to filter content according to criteria of their own 
choosing. The W3C work on standards for Internet accessibility for persons with 
disabilities also takes on a normative role.  
 
Resource Assignment Function 
 
The Internet protocols create two critical resource spaces: the IP address space and the 
domain name space. Less critically, it also requires unique and exclusive assignment of 
protocol port numbers in certain cases, and Autonomous System Numbers. A relatively 
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new IETF-defined protocol, ENUM, also creates an area in which resource assignment 
for ITU and IETF standards intersect, as ENUM maps the ITU’s E.164 standard 
telephone numbers to domain names.  
 
Four key organizations perform the resource assignment functions for the Internet: 1) the 
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), 2) the regional Internet 
address registries (RIRs), 3) the Internet Software Consortium, and 4) International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU). In addition to these four identifiable entities, there is 
also a diverse set of root server operators in the U.S., Europe and Japan associated with 
different organizations but not formally integrated into a corporate entity nor formally 
bound to any governance regime. One might also include international associations of 
country code top level domain (ccTLD) managers, such as CENTR and APTLD, as 
actors in this space. We will discuss each of these organizations in turn, and then describe 
some of the issues surrounding resource assignment. 
ICANN (Nonstate/Formal) 
ICANN is a California nonprofit public benefit corporation, the creation of which was 
invoked by the U.S. Department of Commerce following a public proceeding in 1997-98 
that invited international participation. ICANN took over the resource assignment 
functions associated with the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), an informal 
IETF-associated entity run by University-based computer scientist and Internet pioneer 
Jon Postel. IANA had been funded via grants from U.S. government agencies. In 1998 it 
was detached from the IETF complex of organizations, and bundled with a new, policy-
formulation body (ICANN). ICANN was deliberately set up as a private sector, multi-
stakeholder governance organization, although it included some governmental input 
through its Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC) and its contractual relations with 
the U.S. government. 
 
ICANN engages in governance in two ways: via resource assignment and via policy 
making related to the resources. In this section, we will discuss areas of agreement and 
disagreement only as they pertain to resource assignment, leaving policy issues to the 
next section. 
 
In terms of areas of agreement, there is widespread consensus among the stakeholder 
groups involved in ICANN, including the civil society groups, that a private sector, 
multi-stakeholder governance regime is preferable to an intergovernmental one. There is 
also widespread agreement on the need for a central coordination body to manage the 
DNS.  
 
There are many areas of disagreement. Most fundamental, by reference to the original 
concept of ICANN, is its inability to incorporate most of the country code top-level 
domain managers (ccTLDs) into its regime. Without the full participation and binding 
commitment of these essential elements of the global DNS, ICANN’s governance is 
necessarily limited and fragmented. The structure and processes through which ccTLDs 
are represented in ICANN’s policy formulation processes, and the contractual 
arrangement under which they might be formally bound to the regime’s rules, are still, 
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after six years, unsettled and a source of conflict. However, it should be noted that many 
participants in the process believe that the limits on its power that come from such 
fragmentation are not necessarily a bad thing. 
 
The root server operators have tried to avoid ICANN politics altogether rather than 
bargain and negotiate with it. Key root server operators have participated in ICANN 
advisory committees as individual experts, but with the exception of Verisign, a root 
server operator that is formally contracted to the U.S. and to ICANN as a domain name 
registry, the root server operators have simply pursued their own way. Indeed, many of 
them promulgate a philosophy that argues, persuasively to many steeped in Internet 
traditions of distributed authority, that maintaining the independence of the root server 
operators is a healthy thing for the Internet.  
 
Another major area of disagreement concerns the special role of the US Government as 
contracting authority for ICANN and supervisor of its changes to the root zone. The 
original policy document for ICANN promised to end U.S. supervision after two years. 
U.S. supervision has however continues until 2006 under the current contract. While this 
is not a major source of controversy within ICANN itself, it is a critical source of 
contention among other governments, and was one of the factors leading to the formation 
of the WGIG. 
 
A more subtle but longer term area of disagreement concerns the relationship between 
ICANN rules and IETF standards. It is unclear whether, or to what degree, ICANN 
should, in regulating the suppliers of domain name services, make compliance with the 
relevant standards documents compulsory or not.  
 
Other important areas of disagreement include: the absence of a clear policy or process 
for the addition of new top-level domains; the degree to which ICANN is, or should be, 
accountable to individual users of the Internet; the degree to which ICANN is, or should 
be, accountable to or responsive to governments or independent of them.  
RIRs (NonState/Formal) and NRO (NonState/Informal) 
The Regional Internet Registries (RIRs) are responsible for distribution of Internet 
Number resources, including Autonomous System Numbers and IPv4 and IPv6 
addresses. IP addresses are the most important identifiers for the Internet’s operation. IP 
packets cannot work without unique address assignment and scalable routing techniques 
that permit packets to find their destination. There are now four RIRs: ARIN 
(encompassing North America, parts of the Caribbean and parts of Africa); RIPE-NCC 
(Western and Eastern Europe, parts of Africa, parts of the Middle East); APNIC (Asia, 
Far East); and LACNIC (Latin America). Efforts are underway to create an African RIR 
(AfriNIC). All existing registries are private sector nonprofits with roots in the Internet 
technical community and a membership composed primarily of Internet Service 
Providers, telephone companies and Internet hosting services. 
 
As service organizations with control of valuable resources, the membership base and 
finances of the RIRs are strong. Most RIRs charge fees for address allocations. RIPE has 
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nearly 4,000 members, APNIC and ARIN have nearly 1000. ISPs that receive a direct 
allocation of IP address space from ARIN are automatically accorded membership. Any 
individual can also join ARIN for a $500 annual membership fee. To our knowledge, 
there are no major disagreements regarding policy and governance within the RIRs, or 
across RIRs. Longer term, important issues about economic policy regarding address 
allocation could arise. The fee structures of the RIRs may discourage some kinds of 
smaller scale utilizations of wireless networks. One could debate whether RIRs should 
compete with each other over pricing, whether they should maintain territorial 
monopolies on assignments, and whether addresses should be auctioned. Those issues 
have not surfaced as major points of disagreement yet, however. All of the address 
registries strongly support the private sector-based, “self regulatory” model of 
governance, and oppose movement of these functions into intergovernmental or 
governmental institutions. They have, however, had concerns about and disagreements 
with ICANN.  
 
The Number Resources Organization (NRO) was formed in response to those concerns. It 
is an instrument of collective action among the RIRs that strengthens them in their 
relationship to ICANN. It also allows organizations outside of the RIRs to interact 
directly with all of them at once instead of dealing with each RIR separately. As of this 
writing, it is unincorporated. The MoU on which it was founded creates a framework for 
a global IP address policy development process which in some ways acts as a substitute 
for ICANN’s Address Supporting Organization. Indeed, some of NRO’s founding 
documents and discussions make it clear that the organization was formed in part as an 
entity that might step in to meet the need for IP address allocation should ICANN fail. At 
the current time, however, NRO and ICANN are working together. 
Root Server Operators (Mostly Non-state/Informal) 
Root servers are a critical part of the resource assignment regime of the Internet. They 
provide authoritative data about the top level of the domain name hierarchy. Most of the 
Internet domain name system’s 13 root server operators are not formally tied into a 
governance regime of any kind. Those operated by ICANN itself, and a special root 
server operated by VeriSign under contract with the U.S. Department of commerce, (and 
perhaps also those operated by the US military) are contractually or legally bound to the 
ICANN regime or accountable to the US government. The others, however, are operated 
by heterogeneous actors in different nations. An informal “Root Server Technical 
Operations Association” at www.rootservers.org now gives them something of a common 
voice. They describe themselves as “different professional engineering groups” and stress 
that they are not involved in policy making or data modification – they just publish (and 
do not edit) the root zone file and answer queries. Their presentations emphasize the 
value of diversity and coordination over hierarchy and coercion in coordinating the 
resource.  
 
The Internet Systems Consortium (ISC) is a private, non-profit corporation based in 
California. It operates the “F”-root server, provides DNS hosting for more than 40 top-
level domains, and (most importantly) produces BIND, an open-source software 
implementation of the DNS protocol that has dominated that field since the early days of 
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the Internet.9 ISC’s position as the dominant supplier of DNS software and its control of a 
root server that is “mirrored” globally makes it an important actor in the resource 
assignment/infrastructure operation space. ISC calls itself the “leading supplier of public 
infrastructure for the global DNS.” 
 
In at least one instance, the privatized “stewardship” model followed by the Internet 
developers has allowed actions to be taken quickly and decisively to address governance 
problems. An example is ISC’s deployment of anycast technologies to expand the 
geographical distribution of DNS root servers. ISC’s Paul Vixie used an innovative 
technical configuration to “mirror” root servers all over the world, entering into private 
agreements with Internet operators in many different countries. On the other hand, the 
long-term implications, both policy and technical, of this implementation of anycast are 
not well understood. 
ITU-T (State/Universal) 
ITU plays its most critical resource assignment role as global allocator of radio 
frequencies (ITU-R), but as a physical layer issue radio allocations are considered out of 
scope in discussions of Internet governance. ITU-T is involved in resource assignment 
and administration issues directly related to the Internet due to its role as the assignment 
authority for telephone country codes under its E.164 standard.  
 
The ENUM protocol, which was developed by IETF, maps E.164 telephone numbers into 
domain names. The importance of this protocol, which is too complex to be explained in 
any depth here, is its potential to facilitate interconnection of Internet communications 
with the public switched telephone network; i.e., to serve as a bridge between personal 
computers (or other digital devices connected to the Internet) and the traditional 
telephone network. Deployment of ENUM, however, raises privacy, consumer 
protection, authentication/security, and institutional issues.  
 
Three years ago a disagreement between ITU and the Internet Architecture Board 
(IAB)/IETF broke out over administration of the ENUM domain name space. IAB/IETF, 
supported by the US government and major telecommunication companies, favored 
making <e164.arpa> the root of the ENUM delegation tree and giving the European 
address registry RIPE-NCC the authority to assign country codes. The ITU favored 
considering alternatives to the <e164.arpa> top-level domain. The consensual result for 
now was that RIPE-NCC administers country code assignments under the e164.arpa 
domain, but ITU reviews and approves requests for country code delegations from RIPE. 
ITU considers the issue of the control of the top level domain used by ENUM to be still 
unresolved. 
 
                                                 
9 ISC claims that more than 75% of the world’s DNS name servers run some version of 
BIND.  
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ccTLD Associations (nonState/Formal) 
Country code domain name registries by themselves might be thought of as exclusively a 
national issue. However, the refusal of many ccTLD managers to join the ICANN regime 
fully and their self-organization into associations makes them an alternate source of 
global domain name governance to some degree. The ccTLDs control a considerable part 
of the name space. Two organizations of note are CENTR, the Council of European 
National TLD Registries, and APTLD, the Asia-Pacific Top Level Domain Association. 
 
Policy Functions 
 
A wide variety of policy issues related to the use of the Internet can be identified. They 
include balancing intellectual property protection with fair use and free expression, trade 
and e-commerce, taxation, law enforcement and crime prevention, content regulations 
and freedom of expression, spam, data protection, privacy and surveillance, security, 
rights to domain names, competition policy in the domain name industry, and domain 
name user privacy. Some of these issues are addressed by existing international regimes, 
some are addressed at the national level, others are not fully addressed yet.  They involve 
controversies between different countries, different philosophies about the role of 
regulation generally and disputes among private actors. Because the issue areas are often 
segmented into distinct categories, conflicts among different policy regimes may go 
unnoticed.  Moreover, the framing of the issues in their respective forums are usually 
based on the traditional concepts of territoriality that do not work well in the borderless 
venue provided by the Internet.  
 
The policy functions that have been identified have several common elements.  Most are 
efforts to cope with the borderless nature of the Internet in fields where traditional law 
and practice depends on territoriality.  As a result, the philosophical differences between 
States that have impeded global solutions to many issues continue to be in play.  This has 
the consequence that there are some agreements on principles and norms that should 
apply from a regime to the Internet, such as non-discrimination in the trade area.  At the 
same time, there are many differences in terms of specific rules and procedures.  As a 
consequence, few areas have managed to obtain universal agreements and most devolve 
the responsibility for implementing norms back to the national level. 
ITU (State/Universal) 
In addition to its standard-setting and resource allocation/assignment functions, ITU has 
made policy recommendations in a few areas. Most of them are concentrated in the issue-
area of what we call “operational policies.” One exception is the Plenipotentiary 2002 
Resolution 130 about “security.” The resolution calls for “strengthening the role of ITU 
in information and communication network security” and enhancing cooperation around 
security issues. Like many other “agreements” concerning the Internet, this resolution is 
little more than a statement of some broad norms, and lacks a common factual 
understanding of how the Internet’s architecture or protocols are related to security 
problems. Therefore it cannot translate the norms into rules or procedures that would 
actually structure behavior.  
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ITU-T has also attempted to develop policy agreements concerning interconnection of 
Internet service providers. Table 1 places this is the “Operational Policies” category but it 
could also be viewed as a trade issue. An ITU Study Group is investigating “International 
Charging Arrangements for Internet Services (ICAIS). ITU passed Recommendation 
D.50, a very general, normative statement about compensation for Internet 
interconnection. ITU however, lacks both the depth of agreement and the regulatory 
leverage needed to strongly affect Internet charging arrangements.  
WIPO (State/Universal) 
Intellectual property is an issue-area that has been revolutionized by the Internet. 
Accordingly, there is considerable activity in this area. The WIPO Copyright Treaty 
(WCT) and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT) were both created 
in 1996. In conjunction with the formation of ICANN, WIPO sponsored the First Internet 
Domain Name Process in 1998, which led indirectly to ICANN’s UDRP. In 2001 it 
initiated a Second Internet Domain Name Process proposing new rights to names, such as 
extending protection to the names and acronyms of intergovernmental organizations and 
to the official long and short names of countries. WIPO’s Joint Recommendation 
Concerning the Protection of Marks and Other Industrial Property Rights in Signs on the 
Internet was agreed in 2001, but has not yet been accepted into national laws. WIPO is 
also negotiating a Substantive Patent Law Treaty and there are discussions underway 
regarding protection of databases and the application of copyright protection to Internet 
broadcasting. There are significant disagreements, both among states and between states 
and civil society advocacy groups, regarding these topics. Even the business trademark 
interests do not like many of the WIPO II domain name proposals and they have as yet 
failed to find agreement and implementation from ICANN. 
 
In intellectual property, many of the issues that appeared to be resolved in the mid-1990s 
have led to conflicts with other regimes and norms, making the environment unsettled. 
As law professor Peter Yu wrote, “there remains wide disagreement among countries 
regarding issues such as ‘moral rights,’ ‘fair use,’ duration of copyright, protection in 
data, rights in sound recordings, exhaustion of rights, work-for-hire arrangement and, 
most recently, circumvention of encryption technologies and Internet service provider 
liability.”10 For example, the extent to which WIPO's "Internet treaties" of 1996 conflict 
with freedom of expression and “fair use” is clearly unresolved, as the ongoing 
controversies regarding circumvention of copy protection and peer-to-peer exchange of 
music files shows.  
UN-OHCR (State/Universal) 
A central element of governance is the protection of human rights of all persons.  Applied 
to the Internet, this includes particularly rights of freedom of expression and 
communication.  The impact of efforts to regulate the Internet on these rights has been a 
major point of contention when specific proposals have been tabled in different forums.  
                                                 
10 Peter Yu, “Conflict of Laws Issues in International Copyright Cases, Gigalaw.com, 
http://www.gigalaw.com/articles/2001-all/yu-2001-04-all.html  
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At the same time, the extent to which this has been part of the policy dialogue is highly 
variable. 
 
The international norm on freedom of expression is found in the Universal Declaration on 
Human Rights and is codified in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
in articles 17 and 19. These norms were reaffirmed by the WSIS Declaration. They do 
not, however, specifically address the Internet.  
 
The Commission on Human Rights, in its resolution 2003/42 addressed the Internet by 
calling on States to ‘refrain from imposing restrictions which are not consistent with the 
provisions of article 19, paragraph 3, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, including on: … (c) Access to or use of modern telecommunications 
technologies, including radio, television and the Internet.’  In general, the focus has been 
on access rather than on content, although the same resolution recognized `the positive 
contribution that the exercise of the right to freedom of expression’ that the media and 
new technologies, including the Internet, can make to the fight against racial 
discrimination. 
 
Some Internet content control issues have been taken up within the larger human rights 
regime.  That regime is built around the seven human rights treaties, the work of the 
Commission on Human Rights and the world conferences concerning human rights.  Two 
issues have been dealt with there.  The first is child pornography, which for the Internet is 
explicitly covered by the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography.  Sixty-seven States that 
have become parties to the Convention have undertaken to reflect its rules in national 
laws.  There is clearly a global consensus on the norms because the Optional Protocol 
was adopted by the General Assembly.  The fact that only 67 of 190 States are party to it, 
however, suggests that consensus about specific rules has yet to be obtained.  Further, the 
issue of international enforcement remains unresolved.  
 
The second is racist communication over the Internet.  It has been argued that 
presentation of racist content contravenes the Convention on Racial Discrimination. The 
Durban Declaration of the World Conference on against Racism, Racial Discrimination, 
Xenophobia and Related Intolerance that took place in 2002 contains specific references 
to the Internet.  This indicates a general consensus on the norm that extreme racist 
content should be prevented.  However, there is no consensus about how to address the 
problem. 
 
The issue of privacy has not been addressed in the human rights regime. However, 
General Assembly resolution 45/95 of 14 December 1990 on Guidelines for the 
Regulation of Computerized Personal Data Files, which is the most recent 
pronouncement by that universal body on the issue, provides for protection of files under 
a general concept of privacy, but also states that “[t]he procedures for implementing 
regulations concerning computerized personal data files are left to the initiative of each 
State".  It also assumes that the issue will be handled on a bilateral basis at the 
international level. 
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UNESCO (State/Universal) 
UNESCO’s mandate to promote "the free flow of ideas by word and image" and to 
“maintain, increase and spread knowledge” can be easily and directly linked to Internet 
governance issues.  
 
UNESCO staff has prepared a “Position Statement” on Internet governance outlining a 
set of norms reflecting its mandate. The statement asserts that Internet governance 
mechanisms should be based on the principle of "openness", encompassing 
interoperability, freedom of expression and measures to resist any attempt to censor 
content. It believes that the “inherent openness of the Internet infrastructure must be 
preserved” and that new Internet governance arrangements must not “be subjected to 
governmental control, nor should they facilitate or permit censorship.” UNESCO favors 
requiring “a precise correlation between new [Internet governance] mechanisms and the 
problems they seek to address.” It believes that technical innovation must continue to be 
encouraged; and that new mechanisms should not inhibit interoperability, cause 
instability, nor slow down the continued technical development of the Internet. Any 
global Internet management system or mechanism must be technically competent, 
transparent and non-partisan. 
 
In October 2003 UNESCO's member States adopted a "Recommendation concerning the 
Promotion and Use of Multilingualism and Universal Access to Cyberspace" that agreed 
on the norms of freedom of expression, universal access to information, cultural and 
linguistic diversity and equal access to education. UNESCO is also promoting an 
International Convention on the Protection of the Diversity of Cultural Contents and 
Artistic Expressions, which might have implications for Internet content, ownership of 
Internet content providers, or media-Internet convergence. The UNESCO convention is 
being promoted by those who wish to achieve a “cultural exception” to WTO-based rules 
on free trade in media industries, and thus illustrates the existence of another potential 
regime conflict in the Internet governance space. 
WTO (State/Universal) 
The international trade negotiations, focused on the World Trade Organization and the 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), have had 
difficulty keeping up with developments in the Internet.  There is a consensus that the 
principles of free-trade that are embodied in the GATT and GATS treaties should be 
applied to Internet. In particular, the liberalization of telecommunications services, 
culminating in the 1997 WTO treaty on Basic Telecommunications Services, helped to 
accelerate the development of the Internet in many parts of the world. How trade 
principles apply to particular forms of e-commerce in practice, however, has been subject 
to debate. The general principles, that e-commerce must be dealt with using the same 
criteria as other trade issues and that there should be a moratorium on customs duties on 
digitalized trade, have been in place since 1998 (renewed at Doha).  However, how to 
classify digitalized products for the purpose of applying the trade regime continues to be 
contentious.  This has implications for software development of the Internet itself, since it 
is not clear how to deal with software that is central to the integrity of the Internet. 
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UNCITRAL (State/Universal) 
The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) has focused 
on how to apply earlier agreements on trade law that were based on territoriality to the 
non-territorial Internet. The Model Law on Electronic Commerce was adopted in 1998, 
but has only been converted into national legislation in twenty countries and in most of 
these this was done without an agreement on the key elements of certification and 
electronic signatures.  Moreover, there is considerable variation among national 
adoptions.  An effort to negotiate a convention on “the use of data messages in 
[international trade] [the context of international contracts]” in one of UNCITRAL’s 
Working Groups has proceeded very slowly and even the title of the convention is still 
not agreed. Moreover, the draft convention does not cover contracts concluded for 
personal, family or household purposes and does not deal with consumer protection. 
 
The issue of authentication has been addressed universally through the Model Law on 
Electronic Signatures of UNCITRAL adopted by the General Assembly in 2001.  The 
Model law sets out understandings of what would constitute acceptable digital signatures, 
but is primarily guidance for adjusting national laws.  In fact, as of 15 April 2004, only 
two countries (Thailand and Mexico) had reported applying the model law.  The specifics 
of how to build authentication into software are not addressed. 
UN-ODC (State/Universal) 
The United Nations Convention on Organized Crime, that is supported by the UN Office 
on Drugs and Crime (ODC) refers in Article 29 to the need for training in "Methods used 
in combating transnational organized crime committed through the use of computers, 
telecommunications networks or other forms of modern technology." However, it does 
not provide specific requirements for how to address “borderless” crime. The Convention 
provides a starting point, but also includes controversial approaches, particularly in 
extending cross border surveillance, and critically it offers very weak support for human 
rights and privacy.   
EU (State/Nonuniversal) 
For those aspects of government for which sovereignty has been ceded to the European 
Union, the EU functions as though it were a national government.  For the other aspects, 
where national sovereignty is retained, the EU functions as an international organization.  
In this context it has provided guidance on the organization and management of the 
Internet as well as some of the policy issues that it has defined as falling under that 
rubric. One of these is data protection.  EU Directive 95/46/EC of 25 October 1995 “aims 
to protect the rights and freedoms of persons with respect to the processing of personal 
data by laying down guidelines determining when this processing is lawful.”  The 
directive is intended to harmonize national laws on data protection and has entered into 
force. With respect to Whois data, the EU states that “Neither the Registrars, nor the 
registries, nor ICANN can claim any rights over this type of information.” 
 
In the area of taxation, the EU, through Council Directive 2002/38/EC, of 7 May 2002 as 
regards the value added tax arrangements applicable to radio and television broadcasting 
services and certain electronically supplied services, has established union-wide norms 
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for taxing e-commerce. “For consumption taxes such as VAT, cross-border electronic 
commerce should result in taxation in the jurisdiction where consumption takes place and 
the supply of digitised products should not be treated as a supply of goods. Under the 
provisions of the European Union (EU) VAT system, this means that such digitised 
deliveries are treated as services for tax purposes.”  How to apply this set of procedures 
to non-EU businesses providing services to EU residents is still somewhat unresolved. 
Council of Europe (State/Non-universal) 
A Council of Europe Declaration on Freedom of Communication on the Internet was 
adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 28 May 2003. The Declaration specified a 
series of norms to protect free flow of information.  While not legally binding on States, 
it suggested that public policies should work to open up the Internet rather than limiting 
it, although it also included a standard caveat regarding national security, crime and 
public health exemptions to the provisions. 
 
The Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime tries to unify national laws dealing 
with several different types of crime. The Convention was agreed, but has been ratified 
by only six States, all in Eastern Europe. It has been criticized by civil rights groups as 
taking a too interventionist approach and therefore conflicting with human rights norms. 
The Council of Europe’s Declaration on freedom of communication on the Internet 
provides for privacy in terms of communication and anonymity for senders and receivers.  
However, its limitations are not well-defined.  Under the Optional Protocol, privacy does 
not protect persons who engage in child pornography. 
OECD (State/Non-universal) 
The OECD’s codification of privacy guidelines in its 1980 Guidelines for the Protection 
of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, while predating the Internet, 
articulated widely accepted norms that have proven to be relevant to debates over Internet 
governance. Implementation and enforcement of these norms remains at the discretion of 
national governments. Many believe there is a conflict between ICANN’s Whois 
database policies and the OECD guidelines.  
 
The issue of how to tax Internet transactions shows some of the limitations of regime 
formulation.  The OECD has been discussing the issue for a number of years, but has not 
been able to agree beyond general norms such as non-discrimination.  It has agreed on 
general criteria for assessing proposals, but absent an agreement on such matters as where 
taxes should be collected and on what – a problem similar to that faced by the WTO – 
progress has been slow.  In addition, there are disagreements on how to determine where 
an entity to be taxed is located. 
G8 (State/Non-universal) 
The G8 is an informal group of eight countries: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. The European Union also 
participates and is represented by the European Commission. The Lyon Group is 
composed of senior experts tasked to review and assess existing international agreements 
and procedures to fight organized crime. Its November 2001 recommendations, coming 
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in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States, called for 
weakening privacy laws to enhance “public safety and other social values” and increased 
powers for law enforcement agencies.  
 
In May 2000, the G8 held a conference in Paris on security and confidence in cyberspace 
that brought together high-level government and private sector specialists from all of the 
G8 member countries to discuss cybercrime and the use of the Internet for criminal 
purposes. These efforts were followed up with conferences in Berlin (October 2000) and 
Tokyo (May 2001).  
Hague Conference (State/Non-universal) 
Starting in 1992, the Hague Conference on Private International Law tried to develop a 
Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters. In 
the late 1990s it became evident that the proposed Convention would have far-reaching 
consequences for e-commerce transactions involving the Internet, because it had the 
potential to result in global enforcement of non-harmonized laws. As one critic put it, 
“The treaty gives nearly every member country jurisdiction over anything that is 
published on or distributed over the Internet. If the treaty (as written) is widely adopted, it 
will cripple the Internet.” (Consumer Project on Technology, June 2, 2001). In 2002 the 
negotiations, facing complete failure, were significantly narrowed to focus on clauses 
specifying which courts will have jurisdiction over disputes arising in B2B contracts. 
ASEAN (State/Nonuniversal) 
In September 1996, ASEAN held a Forum on the Internet expressing concerns primarily 
about the content regulation issues posed by the rapid rise of the World Wide Web and 
the discovery by Asian governments that their citizens were being exposed to content 
over which their national governments had little control. The joint press release observed 
that “the trans-border nature of the Internet would open individual countries to external 
influences and affirmed the importance of having safeguards against easy access to sites 
which ran counter to our cherished values, traditions and culture.” No enforcement 
measures, rules or procedures for dealing with this problem were agreed. 
 
In November 2000 ASEAN passed the “e-ASEAN Framework Agreement” on some very 
general norms focused on the economic development potential of ICTs. The member 
states agreed to facilitate the development of information infrastructure, facilitate the 
growth of e-commerce, liberalize trade in ICT-related products and services, reduce the 
digital divide, increase ICT literacy, and promote the use of ICT applications in the 
delivery of government services. Some of the trade facilitation measures of the agreement 
do have enough specificity to be effective, such as an agreement to harmonize tariff 
nomenclature and customs valuation for ICT products, but this does not directly deal with 
the Internet.  
APEC (State/Non-universal) 
The 2000 APEC Ministerial Meeting on the Telecommunications and Information 
Industry adopted a short agreement on “APEC Principles for International Charging 
Arrangements for Internet Services.”  The generality and lack of rules, procedures or 
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enforcement capability in the document is similar to ITU recommendation D.50 and as 
such reflects the lack of consensus among Internet service providers and governments 
about the degree to which Internet interconnection should be governed by means of freely 
developed business contracts or be more regulated by governments.  
 
A 2001 APEC Economic Leaders Declaration in Shanghai, confirms the WTO customs 
moratorium on electronic transactions, and urges national finance ministers to “ensure 
that any taxation of internet services or electronic commerce is clear, consistent, neutral 
and non-discriminatory.”  
ICANN NonState/Formal) 
ICANN has considerable leverage over the domain name registration industry as a policy 
maker because entry into the industry is governed by contracts with ICANN. The terms 
of these contracts are developed by the policy-making processes of the GNSO and 
adopted by the Board. The contracts function as rules governing the Industry and can be 
enforced either through the courts or through withdrawal of the right to operate.  
 
ICANN's contractual agreements with registries and registrars impose a vertical 
separation (analogous to wholesale/retail) of the registry and registrar functions that is 
motivated by competition policy concerns. Competition policy is also implicated in 
ICANN's control over new top level domain additions, as this provides it with control 
over the number and type of competitors in the registry market. While ICANN's registry-
registrar split commands widespread agreement, its TLD addition policy is a source of 
continuing disagreement. ICANN has adopted a purely ad hoc approach to additions, 
failing to articulate any rules and procedures, and only a basic norm (stability) regarding 
their addition.  
 
The ICANN-WIPO Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Procedure (UDRP) can 
be considered a global governance regime for the protection of trademarks in the domain 
name space. WIPO initially developed a proposal for such a dispute resolution procedure, 
but the final policy was made by ICANN and implemented using its contractual powers 
over registrars and registries. Although many critics have questioned its fairness and its 
impact on free expression, the UDRP is very popular among trademark holders and is 
accepted by the domain name registration industry. Few question any longer the general 
need for a global and expedited dispute resolution procedure. Thus, we count this as an 
"area of agreement," but note that there are many calls for improvement. 
 
Privacy issues are also dealt with in ICANN. ICANN’s rules require registrants of 
domain names to display their contact data in a database that can be accessed using the 
Whois protocol and displayed to anyone on the Internet. Trademark interests, law 
enforcement agencies and some other information service provider interests who profit 
from the use of the data favor keeping this data readily available. Privacy advocates in 
civil society, government data protection authorities, domain name registrars, many 
customers, and some registries, on the other hand, favor restricting access more. There is 
also a related debate about the regulations regarding accuracy of the data. This is an area 
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of deep disagreement within ICANN; policy development processes have been going on 
around it for several years. 
 
Freedom of expression issues arise in the context of ICANN’s DNS-related policy 
development. Selections of a top-level domain name string (e.g., .sex, or .kids) raises 
concerns about the content of the string itself (should offensive words be allowed – and 
what about words that are offensive in one language and innocuous in another?). There 
are also issues about the appropriateness of the content under a specific TLD and the 
rules governing that. In addition, ICANN’s domain name dispute resolution process often 
pits owners of trademarks against critics or commentators who want to use those names 
for expressive purposes. The decisions on these cases are completely inconsistent and 
provide registrants and users of domain names no guidance regarding what is permissible 
and what is not. 
ICRA (NonState/Formal) 
The Internet Content Rating Association is an association of major Internet-related 
businesses, including Microsoft, AOL, Verizon, BT, Deutsche Telekom’s T-Online, and 
some regional self-regulatory associations such as South Korea’s R3. It is devoted to the 
promulgation of content rating standards that allow Internet users to effectively classify 
and block what they consider to be undesirable content. The method relies on voluntary 
adoption and self-rating by web site managers. Internet users can then download a free 
label filter software to allow or disallow access to a particular website based on their own 
preferences. ICRA sometimes works with governments and Internet service provider 
associations in specific countries to encourage adoption of the content rating scheme, for 
example Hong Kong. ICRA provides an example of how private sector self-regulatory 
activity provides an alternative to more traditional forms of governance in areas where 
laws are not harmonized. The usefulness of its filters, however, are limited by the 
minimal level of adoption by both content publishers and users.  
ASTA (NonState/Informal) 
Spam -- unwanted and unsolicited email sent indiscriminately to users – is generally 
considered unacceptable.  The discussion of how to deal with it takes place at both 
national levels, where some governments, like the United States, have tried to pass 
legislation controlling it, and at the level of civil society.  A major actor is the Anti-Spam 
Technical Alliance (whose founding members include America Online, British Telecom, 
Comcast, EarthLink, Microsoft, and Yahoo!). 
  
In this area, again, we see shallow agreements on norms, but none on facts. That is, there 
is no consensus about whether the problem can (or should) be dealt with through 
technical standards, modified charging arrangements, legal regulation and sanctions, or 
some combination of all those efforts, nor is there an understanding of what implications 
various paths of attack would have for the Internet as a whole. Adding complexity, the 
spam issue overlaps with freedom of expression, in that any attempt to block all 
unsolicited email would act as a severe constraint on the right to communicate. 
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Recommendations 
The analysis above suggests the following course of action for the WGIG. 
 
First, the WGIG should decide on the relevant statements of fact.  This paper has 
proposed definitions of the Internet, Internet governance, and several other facts.  In this 
analysis, the assumption has been made that the Internet should be defined precisely in 
terms of the use of specific protocols for global interconnection. The WGIG needs to 
decide whether to adopt these, replace them with other definitions, or modify them. 
 
Second, the WGIG should look beyond statements of fact to norms. This report has 
identified two of the most pressing normative issues. One concerns the end to end 
principle. There is an emerging consensus reflected at the March 24, 2004 ICT Task 
Force Global Forum, and other meetings, that the Internet’s status as a neutral channel 
with intelligence and control concentrated in the end points is responsible for much of the 
success of the Internet and should not be disturbed. This norm, however, has not been 
formally accepted and its implications for governance structure have not yet been agreed. 
Lack of agreement about the implications of the non-territorial nature of the Internet is 
another key normative issue.  In establishing norms, the Working Group must decide first 
whether internetworking should conform to the end-to-end principle, and whether its 
structure and governance should continue to be globalized. If those norms are accepted, 
then the focus of policy and governance will be on the senders and recipients of messages 
rather than on the channel itself, and certain constraints on governmental action can be 
accepted as the basis for developing policy.  
 
Finally, the Group should consider how to define, guarantee and protect the roles of the 
various stakeholders in the Internet.  In a state-based international system, it will be 
important find a foundation of legitimacy for non-state actors in governance, giving them 
both authority and accountability.  The Group should consider how the implications of 
clear agreements on definitions, facts and norms could best be reflected in international 
agreements that could take into account the unique characteristics of the Internet. 
 
 
Table 2.  State of agreements, disagreements and gaps in issue areas 
Issue Area Issue Agreements Disagreements Gaps 
 ICANN Registrar Accreditation contract 
secures public, anonymous access, 
individually and in bulk, to registrants’ 
personal contact data in the Whois database 
Concern that Whois access contradicts national and 
international privacy norms and some national laws.    
General Assembly resolution 45/95 of 14 
December 1990 on Guidelines for the 
Regulation of Computerized Personal Data 
Files  
Issue is dealt with through State party reports to the 
Human Rights Committee.  Often seen in the context 
of racism and child pornography. 
There is no clear international standard 
of what constitutes privacy on the 
Internet. 
EU Directive on Protection of Personal Data 
(1995) US Safe Harbor Exception   
Privacy 
OECD Guidelines for the Protection of 
Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal 
Data (1980) 
  
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (2002) (prohibits child 
pornography over the Web) 
  How to enforce this has not been discussed. 
Durban Declaration of the World Conference 
Against Racism (2001) expresses concern 
about use of the Internet for racist content, 
also recognizes value of Internet and new 
media in educating against racism. 
   
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
Articles 17 and 19   
General Comments on Articles 17 and 
19 do not deal specifically with the 
Internet 
Commission on Human Rights resolution 
2003/42 Calls upon States to refrain from 
imposing restrictions on Internet which are not 
consistent with the provisions of article 19, 
paragraph 3, of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights 
CHR comment on Article 10, paragraph 2: exceptions 
may be made if lawful and necessary in a democratic 
society for national security, territorial integrity or 
public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, 
for the protection of health or morals, for the 
protection of the reputation or rights of others, for 
preventing the disclosure of confidential information, 
or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the 
judiciary.  The Declaration leaves it for states to 
determine which elements can be restricted. 
The concept of fair use has not been 
discussed. 
 
No ICANN policy on what TLD strings 
are permissible or prohibited 
Council of Europe Declaration on Freedom of 
Communication on the Internet adopted  by 
the Committee of Ministers on 28 May 2003  
    
ICANN and WIPO Uniform Domain Name 
Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) 
Inconsistent UDRP decisions regarding use of 
trademarked names for criticism and commentary  
Human Rights 
Content Regulation 
and  
Freedom of 
Expression 
Internet Content Rating Association Voluntary private, self-adopted standard;  low levels of adoption  
WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) 1996 Regulation of webcasting Eligibility of databases for protection 
Liability of ISPs for copyright 
infringement by users is not resolved.  
 
 
 
Copyright WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT) 1996 
“there remains wide disagreement among countries 
regarding issues such as ‘moral rights,’ ‘fair use,’ 
duration of copyright, protection in data, rights in 
sound recordings, exhaustion of rights, work-for-hire 
arrangement and, most recently, circumvention of 
encryption technologies and Internet service provider 
liability.” (P. Yu, 2001) 
 In general, IPR protection treaties have 
been drawn up with little consideration 
of their impact on free expression or fair 
use 
WIPO Joint Recommendation Concerning the 
Protection of Marks, and Other Industrial 
Property Rights in Signs on the Internet 
(agreed in 2001, but not considered to be law) 
  
   
ICANN-WIPO UDRP for domain name 
trademark conflicts. 
Prodecure widely criticized as biased towards 
trademark owners. Disagreements about scope of 
protection - inclusion of country codes, 
nonproprietary pharmaceutical names, and names of 
international organizations supported by WIPO, 
opposed by civil society, business and ICANN GNSO 
 
Trademark 
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act 
(US law with extraterritorial application)   
WTO Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property (TRIPS) 
The TRIPS Council continues to hold the view 
expressed in the Council's earlier Progress Report 
(paragraph 12 of document IP/C/18) that the novelty 
and complexity of the intellectual property issues 
arising in connection with electronic commerce are 
such that continued further study is required by the 
international community to better understand the 
issues involved. 
 In general, IPR protection treaties have 
been drawn up with little consideration 
of their impact on free expression or fair 
use 
  
  
Intellectual 
Property Rights 
  
Other IPR issues 
WIPO Substantive Patent Law Treaty under 
negotiation; would promote software patents 
that might have impact on the Internet 
 Impact of patent protection on Internet interoperability not being considered 
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Doha Ministerial Declaration of WTO (2001) 
Members will maintain their current practice 
of not imposing customs duties on electronic 
transmissions until the Fifth Session. 
Institutional arrangements not agreed. 
There were disagreements about how to classify 
digitized products, as services (covered under GATS) 
or as products (covered under GATT). Also issue of 
domestic regulation of e-commerce and its effect on 
trade. 
  
UNCITRAL Model Law adopted, but not 
converted into national legislation and 
differences among adopters already notable  
Disagreements about extent of coverage (limited or 
wider) 
Model Law is not mandatory  
Does not cover contracts concluded for 
personal, family or household purposes 
does not deal with consumer protection  
Trade and e-
commerce 
 Hague Conference’s Proposed Convention on 
Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil 
and Commercial Law 
 Failed to achieve consensus on global convention on 
international jurisdiction; recently narrowed its scope   
2000 OECD Guidelines for Consumer 
Protection in the Context of Ecommerce, 2003 
OECD Guidelines for Protecting Consumers 
from Fraudulent and Deceptive Commercial 
Practices Across Borders 
  
No universal agreement on how to deal 
with consumer protection issues, other 
than to use national means. Consumer Protection 
APEC Voluntary Guidelines for the Online 
Environment   
ICANN Registry-registrar split Many country code TLDs do not adopt the same 
vertical separation of registry and registrar 
No regular, nondiscriminatory TLD 
addition process defined  
ICANN registry contract Most ccTLDs reject ICANN contract; disparity between gTLD and ccTLD obligations 
Registry contracts individually 
negotiated, no uniform contract defined Competition Policy 
EU competition authority review of ISP 
mergers  
No uniform standards and criteria for 
assessing and acting upon market power 
in Internet service markets 
International 
Economic 
Relations 
  
Taxation 
OECD Technical Advisory Group s on Tax in 
partnership with business agreed, with the 
clear principle that source taxation should be 
nondiscriminatory. Thus, income derived from 
a particular country should ideally be taxed as 
if it were earned by a resident of that country.  
Disagreement on how to determine who should tax 
business profits (where business is located).  Does the 
Internet as a new business channel alter the character 
of a product to such a degree that it must be 
considered a wholly new product, and therefore 
treated as unique for tax purposes, or does digitizing a 
product not alter the purpose of the product and 
therefore the digitized version should be treated the 
same for tax purposes as that delivered in physical 
form. Also, differences about where to take (place of 
supply or place of consumption) and difficulties of 
defining that in an Internet context. 
In WTO, whether application of VAT on Internet 
transactions was discriminatory or not. 
United Nations Model Double Taxation 
Convention between Developed and 
Developing Countries last revised in 
1999 does not contain provisions 
regarding e-commerce or the Internet 
(and revisions have been based on 
OECD revisions). 
2002 OECD Guidelines on the Security of 
Information Systems and Networks     
UN General Assembly Resolution 58/199 on a 
Global Culture of Security, A general 
normative declaration calling for 
“international cooperation, when appropriate, 
to secure critical information infrastructures” 
   Network and 
Information System 
Security 
ITU Plenipotentiary 2002 Resolution 130. A 
general normative declaration about 
“Strengthening the role of ITU in information 
and communication network security” and 
enhancing cooperation 
   
Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention 
(hacking, child pornography, copyright 
circumvention, surveillance capabilities, 
mutual legal assistance and extradition) 
Concerns about dual criminality. Only six countries 
(all from Eastern Europe) are Party to the Convention, 
presumably because of conflicts with national law. 
  
UN Convention on Organized Crime  
Article 29 cites need for training in “Methods 
used in combating transnational organized 
crime committed through the use of 
computers, telecommunications networks or 
other forms of modern technology” 
The Convention is controversial, particularly in 
extending cross border surveillance, and offers very 
weak support for human rights and privacy. Civil 
liberties NGOs have argued that it provides too much 
authority to national judicial authorities. 
 
Crime 
G8 Lyon Group on Transnational Organized 
Crime, 2001 recommendations Civil liberties concerns  
DNS Whois database accuracy (ICANN) Relationship between accuracy and privacy.  Who will bear the costs of authenticating registrants? 
Current accuracy policies made without 
reference to privacy rules and norms  
Model Law on Electronic Signatures adopted 
by General Assembly in 2001 (Res. 56/80)   No link to Internet standards 
IETF DNSSEC standard  
(Permits authentication of the validity of a 
domain name) 
Who will manage the private key for the DNS Root 
Zone?   
RIRs securing access to IP address Whois 
information. Secure BGP   
Authentication and 
Identity 
ITU PKI Standards   
Cyber-terrorism 
G8 Lyon Group 2001 Recommendations; 
G8 Justice and Interior Ministers 2002 
Statement on Data availability to Protect 
Public Safety 
 Civil liberties concerns Existing terrorism conventions do not deal with cyber-terrorism 
Enforcement 
Of  
Order 
Spam 
General consensus that SPAM is bad  
ASTA, OECD, ITU conferences and studies 
Many forms of national legislation 
Whether issue should be dealt with through technical 
measures, charging arrangements or legal and policy 
functions. 
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E.164 code assignment and 
.int TLD administration (ITU) 
Who should operate the root zone for ENUM? 
Should there be a single global root for ENUM? 
 
DNS root server administration  
(ICANN, ISC, others) 
 
BIND software 
US Government oversight over ICANN and DNS  
root zone file modifications 
 
 
No procedure for authorizing and 
implementing change in Root Server 
operators 
 
No defined method, schedule or criteria 
for adding new TLDs 
Country code TLD administration 
Relationship of ccTLDs to ICANN ccNSO; 
Authority of national governments over ccTLD 
delegations 
 
IP address administration (ICANN, RIRs) 
Provider based address allocation based on 
need for route aggregation 
  
Global Resource 
Management 
Internationalized Domain Names 
IDN technical standard (IETF) 
Speed and desirability of rapid IDN implementation 
via new TLDs not agreed within ICANN  
   
ITU Recommendation D.50 Settlements based on traffic balance vs. status quo based on negotiated contracts in free market  
ITU standards for PSTN – Internet 
interoperability   
Informal coordination 
among ISPs via NANOG 
  
  
  
Operational 
Policies for the 
Internet 
  
  
  
  
  
Interconnection 
   
 
